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• In recent years, the resurgence of sizable current account
imbalances in the major economies, particularly the U.S.
deﬁcit, has led to renewed academic and public discuss-
ions about their sustainability.
• By themselves, current account imbalances (deﬁcits or
surpluses) are neither good nor bad. They simply reﬂect
the outcome of relative cyclical and structural factors in
domestic and foreign economies.
• Over the second half of the 1990s, the much faster increase
in U.S. productivity compared with that of other major
economies has been an important factor shaping the
evolution of current account balances in major economies.
More recently, however, a key element behind the further
widening in the U.S. current account deﬁcit has been the
loosening in the U.S. ﬁscal stance.
• The experience of recent decades suggests that deﬁcits
similar to those that currently exist do not usually last
for long and can sometimes unwind in the context of
relatively abrupt exchange rate movements. Still, the
current episode is unique in a number of respects. For
instance, it reﬂects in part the relatively favourable U.S.
productivity performance, which (if sustained) could
reduce the likelihood of an abrupt adjustment. Moreover,
some believe that the capacity of the United States to
ﬁnance its current account deﬁcit has increased over time.
• The sizable but orderly depreciation of the U.S. dollar
on a real effective basis since the beginning of 2002 will
contribute to some reduction in external imbalances
among major economies.
here have been renewed academic and pub-
lic discussions in recent years about growing
external imbalances among major econo-
mies, particularly the U.S. current account
deﬁcit. In that context, one of the main objectives of
this article is to show that current account balances are
simply the outcome of various relative structural and
cyclical forces between trading partners. The ﬁrst sec-
tion of this article is a review of the underlying deter-
minants of the changes in current account positions
among the three largest industrial economies (the
United States, Japan, and the euro area)1 since the
mid-1990s.
In the second section, possible risks to macroeconomic
and financial stability that might stem from large
current account deﬁcits and the associated buildup of
international liabilities are discussed. We review a
range of outside assessments by the Organisation for
EconomicCo-operationandDevelopment (OECD)and
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and in the
academic literature, of current external imbalances, as
well as the international historical experience (notably
in the 1980s) with external imbalances that are similar
to those that currently exist. Evidence indicates that
large deficits in industrialized countries do not usu-
ally persist for long and that their unwinding gener-
ally involves a signiﬁcant currency depreciation and a
slowing in the growth of domestic demand. The paral-
lels that can be drawn with recent developments in
exchange markets and U.S. economic activity make
this article particularly topical.
1.  The United States, Japan, and the euro area are collectively referred to as
the “G-3.”
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Recent Current Account
Developments in the G-3
A key feature of current account developments in the
major economies since the mid-1990s is that the U.S.
deﬁcit has more than tripled. It rose from 1.5 per cent
of GDP in 1997 (its approximate average value over
the previous two decades) to 4.6 per cent in 2002 (Table
1).2 At the same time, while a sizable surplus position
was maintained in Japan, and to a lesser extent in the
euro area, other economies, particularly certain devel-
oping countries, experienced a substantial shift from a
deﬁcit to a surplus position. The newly industrialized
Asian economies3 also witnessed a sizable increase in
their surplus positions in recent years. Consequently,
the combined Japanese-euro area surplus, which more
2.  The Box on p. 13 outlines the disparate data sources and measurement
errors that complicate the analysis of current account balances and interna-
tional investment positions. These caveats must be kept in mind where dis-
crepancies are found between conceptually equivalent statistics such as those
reported in the tables and ﬁgures in this article.
3.  Hong Kong SAR, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan, Province of China.
United Statesa -128.4 -203.8 -292.9 -410.3 -393.7 -480.9 -352.5
(-1.5) (-2.3) (-3.2) (-4.2) (-3.9) (-4.6) -3.1 b
Euro areaa c 98.2 62.5 29.0 -28.7 11.8 61.2 -37.0
(1.5) (0.9) (0.4) (-0.5) (0.2) (0.9) -0.6 b
Japana 96.6 119.1 114.5 119.6 87.8 112.7 +16.1
(2.2) (3.0) (2.6) (2.5) (2.1) (2.8) +0.6 b
Canadaa -8.2 -7.7 1.7 20.7 17.3 14.9 +23.1




economies 8.5 66.8 60.1 43.5 54.6 68.0 +59.5
Other advanced
economies 22.0 3.7 -7.2 20.7 31.3 37.5 +15.5
Developing
countries -55.6 -82.6 -9.6 67.8 25.9 74.0 +129.6
Countries in
transition -25.3 -29.5 -2.4 25.1 12.8 9.9 +35.2
Totald 7.8 -71.6 -106.8 -141.6 -152.2 -102.8 -110.6
Table 1
Global Current Account Balances
US$ billions




a. The ﬁgures in brackets are the current account balances as a percentage of nominal
GDP. More details about the classiﬁcation of countries into major groups (e.g.,
advanced, developing, or in transition) can be found in the statistical appendix of the
IMF World Economic Outlook.
b. Figures are expressed in percentage points.
c. Calculated as the sum of the balances of individual euro-area countries
d. Reﬂects errors, omissions, and asymmetries in balance-of-payments statistics on the
current accounts. Excludes data for international organizations and some countries.
Source: IMF
than offset the U.S. deﬁcit in 1997, accounted for less
than 40 per cent of the U.S. deﬁcit by 2002. While not
the focus of this article, this development underscores
the growing importance of emerging economies on
the global economic scene.4
A key feature of current account
developments in the major economies
since the mid-1990s is that the U.S.
deﬁcit has more than tripled.
Valuable insights into the evolution of current account
balances can be gained by examining their underlying
determinants. In this regard, current account balances
can be analyzed by considering two different perspec-
tives, which are consistent and mutually reinforcing:
(1) a domestic perspective based on savings and
investment, and (2) an international perspective based
on trade ﬂows in goods and services.5
Savings-investment perspective
From the basic national accounts identities, we can
show that current account balances reﬂect the differ-
ence between domestic savings and investment.6
Indeed, international financial integration and mobility
4.  Although it is a major trading nation, Canada’s current account balance is
relatively small (an average surplus of about US$16 billion since 2000). Conse-
quently, Canada has not contributed signiﬁcantly to global external imbal-
ances.
5.  Current account balances fundamentally reﬂect domestic savings and
investment conditions. However, international forces have a bearing on
domestic conditions, notably through their inﬂuence on interest rates and
exchange rates.
6.  Consider the following concepts: GNDY = GNP + NCT
GNP = GDP + NY
GDP = C + I + G + X – M
where GNP is gross national product
GDP is gross domestic product
GNDY is the gross national disposable income
C is consumer expenditure
I is business investment and residential construction
G is government purchases of goods and services
X is export of goods and services
M is import of goods and services
NY is net income from abroad
NCT is net current transfers
T is government tax receipts.
The current account balance (CAB) is:
CAB = X – M + NY + NCT
= (GNDY – T – C) + (T – G) – I
= Private savings + Government savings – Investment.13 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • WINTER 2003–2004
ofcapitalallowadeficitinsavingsrelativetoinvestment
in one economy to be “ﬁnanced” by surplus savings in
foreign economies, which contributes to an efﬁcient
worldwide allocation of resources.7
As can be seen from Table 2, domestic investment was
systematically larger than domestic savings in the
United States over the 1997–2002 period. As a result,
the United States has been a net borrower of foreign
savings. In contrast, the euro-area and Japanese econ-
omies are both signiﬁcant net lenders to the rest of the
world. Although investment (as a proportion of GDP)
is larger in the euro area and Japan than in the United
States, the proportion of savings is also much greater.
In part as a result of forward-looking expectations,
global productivity developments had many economic
and ﬁnancial repercussions in the United States and
therestoftheworld,notablyoninvestmentandsavings.
In particular, there was a substantial upward shift in
U.S. labour-productivity growth relative to the previ-
ous two decades (Table 3). In contrast, labour-produc-
tivity growth continued its downward trend in both
Japan and the euro area. As a result, the U.S. produc-
tivity performance shifted from well below that of
Japan and the euro area to well above them (the so-
called “U.S. productivity miracle”).
7. Shifts in the “world” real interest rates help to equalize savings and invest-
ment at the global level. For instance, when investment is larger (smaller) than
savings, this puts upward (downward) pressure on real interest rates, which
induces savings to increase (decrease) and investment to decrease (increase).
In part as a result of forward-looking
expectations, global productivity
developments had many economic
and ﬁnancial repercussions in the
United States and the rest of the
world, notably on investment and
savings.
Between 1997 and 2000, the foreign-borrowing needs
of the United States increased markedly, reﬂecting
mainly a substantial rise in the proportion of invest-
ment in GDP. The much more pronounced rise in U.S.
investment compared with other industrialized econo-
mies resulted in large part from the signiﬁcant and
sustained rise in U.S. productivity since the mid-1990s,
which raised longer-term prospects for potential
growth in the U.S. economy. The capital-stock adjust-
ment to this higher perceived growth rate for trend
output  (i.e., a shift to a higher capital-labour ratio),
along with a higher rate of depreciation of the capital
stock (i.e., a shift in the composition of capital towards
short-lived assets such as computer equipment) led to
a substantial growth in U.S. business investment.
The Global Current Account Discrepancy and Other Statistical Problems
As highlighted by the IMF (2002c), various meas-
urement errors complicate the analysis of current
account imbalances and the balance of payments
more generally. A comparison of Tables 1, 2, and 4
shows that there can be signiﬁcant discrepancies
not only between balances for the current account
and the ﬁnancial and capital account (balance-of-
payments data), but also between measures of
domestic savings relative to investment (national
accounts data). Yet, in theory, all of these measures
should give the same results.
At the global level, these statistical problems add
up to sizable discrepancies. While the world cur-
rent account should, in principle, be in balance, the
IMF estimates that it reached a deficit of US$103 bil-
lion in 2002. This suggests that some countries’
reported current account deﬁcits might be exagger-
ated, or the current account surpluses of others
might be underestimated. This raises the question
of how much of the observed current account
imbalances are simply the result of measurement
errors.
There are also problems with the measurement of
international investment positions. In this regard,
Warnock and Cleaver (2002) argue that the U.S.
debtor position, which has grown rapidly in recent
years, has been overstated because U.S. holdings of
foreignsecuritiesareunderestimated,whileforeign
holdings of U.S. securities are overestimated.14 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • WINTER 2003–2004
Moreover, the sharp rise in U.S. stock market prices
(up to 2000), which reﬂected in part the improved
longer-term prospects for potential growth in the U.S.,
led to a signiﬁcant reduction in the cost of equity
ﬁnancing,whichprovidedfurtherimpetustobusiness
investment.8
In the second half of the 1990s, U.S. ﬁscal consolida-
tion, helped by stronger real growth in U.S. GDP, led to
a marked rise in public savings. However, there was a
concurrent reduction in U.S. private savings (house-
holds and corporations), apparently reﬂecting in part
the sharp increase in net wealth (owing mainly to rises
in equity and housing prices)9 and increased con-
sumption in anticipation of higher future income,
reﬂecting improved longer-term prospects for poten-
tial growth.10 Although there was a rise in U.S. overall
savings, it was not sufﬁcient to ﬁnance the increase in
investment.
In more recent years, the greater foreign borrowing by
the United States has stemmed from a signiﬁcant
decline in public savings. Although there was a sharp
retrenchment in U.S. investment in 2001 and 2002,
reﬂecting in part an adjustment to the over-investment
that took place during the late 1990s, particularly in the
information and communication technology indus-
tries, there was an even more pronounced easing in
the U.S. ﬁscal stance that substantially reduced the
amount of public savings. The decline in overall sav-
ings was attenuated, however, by a signiﬁcant pickup
in private savings. This apparently reﬂected, in part,
some unwinding of the earlier wealth effect, owing to
8.  According to an empirical analysis conducted by the OECD (2001), other
factors, such as the pickup in output growth (the traditional “accelerator
effect”) and  the ongoing decline in the relative prices of capital goods, also
explain the acceleration in U.S. business investment during the second half of
the 1990s.
9.  The OECD reported that net wealth of U.S households  rose by about 160
percentage points relative to their disposable income between the end of 1994
and the end of 1999. The large accumulation of wealth had major implications
for U.S. household savings, because wealthier households tend to spend more
on goods and services (see IMF 2002a). In their empirical study, de Serres and
Pelgrin (2002) argue that “Ricardian equivalence” could explain a large part
of the decline in U.S. private savings in the second half of the 1990s. Ricardian
equivalence suggests that expectations of lower taxes in the future (which
could have been the case when ﬁscal consolidation took place) would have
reduced the savings rate of households and businesses.
10.  As argued by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1994, 1996), the intertemporal
approach views the current account balance as the outcome of forward-look-
ing dynamic savings and investment decisions. According to the permanent-
income hypothesis, household consumption is based on the discounted value
of expected future income (as opposed to current income alone). As a result, a
permanent (country-speciﬁc) increase in productivity leads to a current
account deﬁcit so that agents can smooth consumption over their lifetime.
This implies that a deﬁcit represents expectations about high future growth
relative to other countries.
United States 1.0 1.1 2.2
Japan 2.8 2.2 1.3
Euro area 2.1 2.1 0.9
Canada 0.9 1.2 1.7
Table 3
Labour Productivity in the Business Sector
Average annual growth rate*
1976–86 1987–95 1996–2002





balance -1.8 -1.9 -2.6 -2.7 -2.6 -3.6 -1.8
Gross savings
Total 18.1 18.8 18.4 18.4 16.5 15.0 -3.1
Public 1.9 3.1 3.8 4.4 2.6 -0.2 -2.1
Private 16.2 15.7 14.6 14.0 13.9 15.2 -1.0
Gross investment
Total 19.9 20.7 20.9 21.1 19.1 18.6 -1.3
Public 3.2 3.2 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.4 +0.2




balance 2.2 2.9 2.5 2.5 2.1 2.8 +0.6
Gross savings
Total 30.8 29.7 28.4 28.7 27.7 26.5 -4.3
Public 5.1 3.8 2.4 1.8 3.5 1.0 -4.1
Private 25.7 25.9 26.0 26.9 24.1 25.5 -0.2
Gross investment
Total 28.6 26.8 25.9 26.2 25.6 23.7 -4.9
Public 7.6 7.4 7.8 6.9 6.6 6.3 -1.3




balance 0.9 0.1 -0.1 -0.9 -0.4 0.6 -0.3
Gross savings
Total 21.3 21.2 21.2 21.1 20.6 20.7 -0.6
Public 0.1 0.8 1.9 2.3 1.7 1.8 +1.7
Private 21.2 20.3 19.3 18.8 18.9 18.8 -2.4
Gross investment
Total 20.3 21.0 21.3 22.0 21.0 20.0 -0.3
Public 2.7 2.7 2.8 2.8 2.9 2.8 +0.1
Private 17.7 18.3 18.5 19.2 18.1 17.2 -0.5
Table 2
Savings – Investment Balances in the G-3
Per cent of nominal GDP
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the sharp decline in stock market prices and a concomi-
tant reassessment of future income expectations.
Elsewhere, the relative stability of the net lending
position of Japan and the euro area over the 1997–2002
period masked different underlying trends in overall
savings and investment. In the euro area, savings and
investment rates, which are close to the average for
advanced economies, were relatively steady. In con-
trast, Japanese investment and savings rates declined
from exceptionally high levels. Indeed, the decline in
Japanese investment mainly seems to be a convergence
to more normal levels following the huge over-invest-
ment that took place in the late 1980s, when the Japa-
nese asset-price bubble substantially lowered the cost
of capital.
A closer examination reveals that public savings in the
euro area increased signiﬁcantly as a result of the ﬁs-
cal consolidation that was required by the Maastricht
Treaty before the adoption of the common currency in
January 1999. However, an offsetting shift in private
savings likely reﬂected, in part, wealth effects and
demographic trends.11 In contrast, there was a large
reduction in public savings in Japan, reﬂecting the
impact on public ﬁnances of weak economic activity
and the adoption of discrete ﬁscal measures to sustain
aggregate demand.12
Trade-ﬂow perspective
Current account balances can also be examined
directly by considering the evolution of exports and
imports of goods and services (Table 4).13 In this
11. OECD (2003b) estimates show that household net wealth (as a per cent of
disposable income) in the three major economies of the euro area  increased
substantially between the end of 1994 and the end of 1999 (161 percentage
points in France, 38 percentage points  in Germany, and 29 percentage points
in Italy). De Serres and Pelgrin (2002) also estimate that the aging of the popu-
lation in the major euro-area countries has reduced the savings rate signiﬁ-
cantly (this impact is much greater in Japan but is absent in the United States).
According to the life-cycle hypothesis, an increase in the old age dependency
ratio (i.e., the population over 64 years relative to the population between the
ages of 20 and 64 years) results in a decline in the savings rate as an increasing
share of the population is drawing down ﬁnancial assets to sustain its con-
sumption.
12.  Note that, in Table 2, the general government balance will be reﬂected in
the difference between gross public savings and gross public investment.
However, our discussion of the changes over time focuses on gross public
savings, owing to the relative stability of gross public investment.
13.  Apart from trade in goods and services, the current account balance also
covers transfers, as well as receipts from, and payments of income to, foreign-
ers. Transfers typically include ofﬁcial grants and private remittances, while
income covers mainly investment income (receipts on country-owned assets
abroad and payments on foreign-owned assets in the country). Those compo-
nents are not covered explicitly in our analysis, since they are responsible for
only a small portion of the overall movement in G-3 current account balances.
regard, we will highlight in our analysis two main
forces shaping the trade ﬂows of goods and services.14
First is the income effect, whereby a country’s demand
for imports is positively related to its income. Similarly,
export demand is positively related to foreign income.
Thus, changes in the relative cyclical position (domes-
tic versus foreign real GDP) will be a key determinant
in shaping the evolution of the current account bal-
ance. Second is the relative price effect, whereby a
country’s demand for imports and, similarly, its
demand for exports, depends on the price of domestic
goods and services compared with the price of foreign
goods and services, adjusted for transportation costs
and converted to the local currency. If domestic goods
14.  Our analysis of the nominal current account balance focuses on the deter-
minants of the real trade ﬂows. This approach has been commonly used by
the IMF and the OECD, and is consistent with studies such as those of Clarida
and Prendergast (1999) and Kandil and Greene (2002). Nevertheless, changes
in terms of trade (i.e., the price of exports relative to the price of imports) can
have a signiﬁcant impact on the evolution of current account balances. For
instance, a rise in the price of commodities (e.g., world oil prices) will contri-
bute to raise the current account balance of oil-exporting countries, but will
have the opposite effect on oil-importing countries.
United States
1997 -1.5 -0.7 -2.4 1.1 0.2 -0.5
1998 -2.3 -1.8 -2.8 1.0 0.1 -0.6
1999 -3.1 -2.4 -3.7 0.9 0.2 -0.5
2000 -4.2 -3.0 -4.6 0.8 0.2 -0.6
2001 -3.9 -2.9 -4.2 0.7 0.1 -0.5
2002 -4.6 -3.6 -4.6 0.6 – -0.6
Japan
1997 2.3 3.0 2.4 -1.3 1.4 -0.2
1998 3.0 3.5 3.1 -1.3 1.4 -0.2
1999 2.6 3.3 2.8 -1.2 1.3 -0.3
2000 2.5 3.5 2.5 -1.0 1.3 -0.2
2001 2.1 3.0 1.7 -1.1 1.7 -0.2
2002 2.8 3.9 2.4 -1.1 1.7 -0.1
Euro area*
1997 1.0 2.1 2.0 – -0.3 -0.7
1998 0.4 1.1 1.8 0.1 -0.5 -0.8
1999 -0.4  0.6 1.2 -0.3 -0.6 -0.7
2000 -1.0  0.8 0.5 -0.3 -0.4 -0.8
2001 -0.2 1.4 1.1 – -0.5 -0.7
2002 0.9  2.4 1.8 0.2 -0.4 -0.7
Table 4
Current Account Balances in the G-3
Per cent of nominal GDP
Total Total Goods Services Income Current
excluding transfers
oil imports
* Corrected for reporting discrepancies in intra-area transactions
Source: OECD16 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • WINTER 2003–2004
and services become less expensive compared with
foreign goods and services, for example, then domes-
tic demand will shift away from imported goods
and services towards those produced domestically.
This would also increase foreign demand for the home
country’s now relatively less expensive exports. This
is the concept of the competitiveness of a country rela-
tive to its trading partners, which is usually measured
by a trade-weighted real effective exchange rate.15
Charts 1 to 3 allow us to better understand the historical
relationships among current account balances, the rel-
ative cyclical position, and the real effective exchange
rate in the G-3 economies.16 In this light, we can see
that the marked widening in the U.S. current account
deﬁcit since the early 1990s reﬂects, in part, faster GDP
growth in the United States compared with that of its
major trading partners. Moreover, the adverse lagged
impact of the sharp real appreciation of the U.S. dollar
(by almost 50 per cent in real effective terms between
April 1995 and February 2002) on the real trade balance
also contributed to the widening in the U.S. current
account deficit in more recent years. According to IMF
estimates (2002d), the widening of the U.S. current
account deﬁcit over the 1995–2001 period (by about
3.5 percentage points relative to nominal GDP) is
explained mainly by the appreciation of the U.S. dollar,
which accounts for 2 percentage points of the widening,
and to a lesser extent by the shift in the relative cyclical
position, which accounts for 1 percentage point.
15.  Lafrance (1988) and Lafrance and St-Amant (1999) reviewed the concept
of competitiveness and the construction of various cost- and price-based
measures. A depreciation (appreciation) in  the real effective exchange rate
represents an improvement (deterioration) in the competitive position of an
economy. It is also important to note that the impact of these shifts in relative
prices on real trade ﬂow of imports and exports usually operates with some
lags, depending in part on the duration of prior contractual agreements.
16. Our analysis is based on the IMF index of the trade-weighted real effective
exchange rate, which is the ratio of the unit labour costs of the home country
to those of 20 of its trading partners, converted to the home currency. For
illustrative purposes, the index has been inverted such that a decline (rise) in
the index reﬂects a real appreciation (depreciation) of the currency, which
should lead over time to a decline (rise) in the current account balance (i.e.,
higher [lower] real imports and lower [higher] real exports). Similarly, we
have constructed a trade-weighted measure of relative cyclical positions that
is based on the ratio of real GDP in the home country relative to that of its
10 largest trading partners. A decline (rise) in the index reﬂects a faster
(slower) rate of growth in the home country relative to its major trading
partners, which should lead to a decline (rise) in the current account balance
(i.e., a larger [smaller] rise in real imports compared to real exports).
The marked widening in the U.S.
current account deﬁcit since the early
1990s reﬂects, in part, faster GDP
growth in the United States
compared with that of its major
trading partners.
Not only has U.S. real GDP been growing relatively
faster than those of its major trading partners, but an
asymmetry in income elasticity between U.S. imports
and exports has exacerbated the adverse impact on
the U.S. current account balance. Indeed, even if the
U.S. economy were growing at the same rate as the
rest of the world, the U.S. current account would still
tend to deteriorate, because there is apparently a
much larger income elasticity of U.S. imports relative
to U.S. exports. Estimates of income elasticities for U.S.
imports have typically been between 1.5 and 2.5, while
those for U.S. exports have been closer to 1.0. As
reported in Mann (1999), this has been a consistent
feature of the empirical literature of the post-war
period.
Chart 1
Determinants of Trade Flow in the United States
Annual average
Note: For 2003, we show the average monthly value (up to November) for the
real effective exchange rate. As well, the current account and relative
cyclical position are based on IMF projections (2003). (See footnote 16
for a detailed description of the index.)
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In contrast to the U.S. economy, the relative cyclical
positions of both Japan and the euro area have weak-
ened markedly since the early 1990s, as growth in
those countries fell considerably behind that of the
United States, which tended to improve their current
account balances in more recent years. In the euro
area, this was reinforced by the signiﬁcant deprecia-
See note to Chart 1.
Source: IMF and OECD
Chart 2
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tion of the euro between February 1996 and October
2000 (by about 30 per cent). In Japan’s case, however,
the exchange rate probably played a modest role,
since it has remained relatively ﬂat over the past sev-
eral years. Nevertheless, the above-mentioned posi-
tive inﬂuences on the current account balances of both
the euro area and Japan have been offset to some
extent by the adverse impact of higher world oil prices
in recent years.17
Possible Implications for Macro-
economic and Financial Stability
While external imbalances in the major economies
have been growing in recent years, some commenta-
tors have expressed concerns about the sustainability
of the U.S. current account deﬁcit. A major concern is
the possibility that a sudden shift in expectations (par-
ticularly regarding the relatively more favourable U.S.
prospectsforlonger-termproductivitycomparedwith
those of other economies) could lead to abrupt
changes in foreign exchange and ﬁnancial markets,
and ultimately cause disruptive changes in the macro-
economy. As argued by the IMF (2003), Mann (2002),
and McKinnon (2001), the adverse balance-sheet
effects of a sharp U.S.-dollar depreciation would fall
mainly on the rest of the world, because most U.S. for-
eign liabilities are denominated in U.S. dollars.
However, recent developments have been benign.
Despite some downward revisions to U.S.  prospects
for return on capital in recent years, the U.S.-dollar
depreciation since the beginning of 2002, though sig-
niﬁcant, has so far taken place in an orderly fashion,
and without substantial adverse effects on U.S. inter-
est rates. In this regard, movements in ofﬁcial reserves
from foreign authorities (notably in Asia) have pro-
vided support for the U.S. dollar. Such capital ﬂows
have become an increasingly important source of
“ﬁnancing” for the U.S. current account deﬁcit.18
17.  While the average price for West Texas Intermediate crude oil was about
US$18 in the 1997–99 period, it jumped to an average of about US$27.5 in the
2000–2002 period, which represents an increase of over 50 per cent. In this
regard, the ﬁgures shown in the column “Total current account balance,
excluding oil imports” in Table 4 are more consistent with developments in
the relative cyclical position and the real exchange rate. It is also likely that
structural changes over the past decade or so (namely, greater integration
with other Asian economies, which involved outsourcing of production) have
led to a decline in Japanese export performance.
18.  Though negligible in 2001, foreign ofﬁcial reserve ﬂows accounted for
almost 20 per cent of the net capital inﬂows into the United States in 2002.
Over the ﬁrst three quarters of 2003, their share rose to almost 35 per cent of
net inﬂows.
Chart 3
Determinants of Trade Flow in the Euro Area
Annual average
See note to Chart 1.



















1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Current account









1980 = 10018 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • WINTER 2003–2004
In this context, the next section examines some potential
implications for macroeconomic and financial stability
stemming from external imbalances, notably by
reviewing lessons from the international experience.
What does history tell us?
In principle, a current account deﬁcit could be sus-
tained as long as the stream of earnings from the
investment ﬁnanced by foreign savings covered the
ﬁnancing cost (i.e., interest payments and divi-
dends).19 In this regard, the Canadian experience
shows that a country can run a sizable current account
deﬁcit for an extended period. Indeed, Canada
recorded current account deﬁcits throughout most of
its history. Between 1870 and the early 1910s, Can-
ada’s current account deﬁcit averaged about 7 per cent
and reached a peak of close to 18 per cent of GDP
before World War I (Powell 1997; Urquhart 1993).20
Since the 1970s, large current
account deﬁcits have generally not
been sustained for long . . . .
Nevertheless, some commentators
remain conﬁdent that U.S. current
account deﬁcits and the associated
buildup of external liabilities could be
sustained well into the future.
More comprehensive reviews of the international
experience among industrial countries by Freund
(2000) and the IMF (2002c), however, show that, since
the1970s,largecurrentaccountdeﬁcitshavegenerally
not been sustained for long. A typical current account
reversal begins when the deﬁcit is about 5 per cent of
GDP and is associated with a combination of slower
real GDP growth and a signiﬁcant depreciation of the
real effective exchange rate (interest rates are also
19.  A more detailed discussion of what constitutes a sustainable external
position can be found in Bank of Canada (1985) and IMF (2002b). Some of the
medium-term issues covered in those studies include the importance of con-
sidering the source of the current account imbalance (i.e., changes in domestic
savings versus changes in domestic investment and their sustainability), as
well as the composition of external liabilities.
20.  This was associated with substantial foreign direct investment in the
resource sector of the Canadian economy and in railway construction to open
up the western part of the country.
found to rise noticeably in the years preceding the
reversal).
A number of useful parallels can be drawn between
the current situation and that of the mid-1980s.21
These parallels support the view that large external
imbalances can be resolved gradually without a sig-
niﬁcant adverse impact on ﬁnancial stability or the
macroeconomy. Exchange rate movements can be
signiﬁcant, however. For example, as can be seen from
Chart1,themarkedwideningintheU.S.currentaccount
deﬁcit in the 1982–87 period (to about 3.5 per cent of
GDP) coincided with much faster aggregate demand
growth in the United States compared with that of its
major trading partners. The adverse lagged impact on
real trade of the sharp real appreciation of the U.S.
dollar (by about 50 per cent in real effective terms
between July 1980 and March 1985) also contributed
to the widening in the U.S. current account deﬁcit.
Subsequently, the gradual elimination of the U.S. cur-
rent account deﬁcit between 1987 and 1991 was
helped by a relatively sharper slowing in U.S. real
GDP growth compared with that of its major trading
partners.22 Moreover, the substantial real effective
depreciation of the U.S. dollar that began in March
1985 played a key role in the external adjustment
process.
International investment positions and the
role of exchange rates
Another way to evaluate the sustainability of current
account imbalances is to consider the path of the asso-
ciated buildup of net external assets or liabilities (as a
ratio to GDP). As can be seen from Chart 4, the capital
inﬂows that have been the counterpart to persistent
U.S. current account deﬁcits have cumulated into a
sizable net international liability position.23 In contrast,
Japanese current account surpluses have translated
21.  One should note that U.S. trade patterns are now signiﬁcantly different
from those of the 1980s. In particular, Mexico, South Korea, Singapore, China,
and Hong Kong SAR have become much more important trading partners for
the United States.
22.  In 1991, the U.S. current account balance was also boosted by large one-
time transfers from allies who shared some of the costs related to the Gulf
War.
23.  Net international investment positions also reﬂect changes in the valua-
tion of exchange rates. In this regard, Tille (2003) shows that 30 per cent of the
deterioration in the U.S. net investment position between 1999 and 2001 is
accounted for by changes in the value of U.S. foreign assets, owing to the
U.S.-dollar appreciation. As a result, the author believes that the U.S. net
international investment position is less worrisome than if it reﬂected only
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into a relatively large net international asset position.
Looking forward, most forecasts imply that Japanese
net assets and U.S. net liabilities will continue to rise
sharply over coming years, to reach unprecedented
levels.24
Yet, the U.S. net liability position cannot grow indeﬁ-
nitely. A number of conditions need to be satisﬁed to
achieve a sustainable external position. In particular,
the net liability position (as a ratio to GDP) has to sta-
bilize at a level that is acceptable to both borrowers
and lenders. In this regard, Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000)
argue that even if the United States has the means to
repay its liabilities, “home bias” in asset holdings sug-
gests that the rest of the world’s willingness to absorb
U.S. liabilities is limited. The authors also point out
that the current U.S. net international liability position
(25 per cent of GDP at the end of 2002) is extremely
high by historical standards. For instance, at the end
of the nineteenth century, when the United States was
24.  Canada’s net international liability position (as a per cent of GDP), which
in the past has been larger than that of the United States, has declined consid-
erably since its peak in 1993.
Chart 4
Net International Investment Positions
Market values at year-end, as a per cent of GDP*
* International investment positions reﬂect not only the accumulation of current
account balances but also exchange rate and other market valuations. For
instance, the sharp decline in the Japanese international net asset position
between the end of 1998 and the end of 1999 (despite a continued current
account surplus) reﬂected mainly the adverse impact on asset valuations
(largely denominated in U.S. dollars) of the sizable appreciation of the Japa-
nese yen vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar and the increase in liabilities stemming from
the gain in Japanese stock prices.
Source: IMF up to 2001, except for the euro-area data, which are taken from the
European Central Bank Monthly Bulletin and, prior to 1997, from Fagan
et al. (2001). For 2002, ﬁgures are from the U.S. Bureau of Economic



















an emerging giant, its net international liability posi-
tion never exceeded 26 per cent. Long-term sustaina-
bility also implies that a country with net foreign
liabilities must have a trade surplus in goods and
services in steady state to ﬁnance the stream of inter-
est and dividend payments. As a result, it is clear that
signiﬁcant adjustments to external imbalances in the
major economies will eventually need to take place.
Nevertheless, some commentators remain conﬁdent
that U.S. current account deﬁcits and the associated
buildup of external liabilities could be sustained well
into the future. Cooper (2001) argues that the propor-
tion of foreign savings invested in the United States is
much lower than the weight of the U.S. economy in
world GDP. Greenspan (2003) and McKinnon (2001)
also point to the special role played by the U.S. dollar
in the world economy. In this regard, the Chairman of
the U.S. Federal Reserve Board, Alan Greenspan, has
argued that the ability of the United States to ﬁnance
its external deﬁcit in a reserve currency has increased
its capability to incur foreign debt relative to most
other countries. He also suggested that globalization
(namely, reduced costs and increased reach of inter-
national ﬁnancial intermediation) has, over time,
improved the U.S. capacity for raising debt. As a
result, comparisons with earlier episodes might be
misleading.
Over the medium term, a number of structural factors
could contribute to the narrowing of external imbal-
ances among the United States, Japan, and the euro
area, as well as other countries. The OECD (2001), for
example, has argued that there could be a conver-
gence in productivity growth rates between the main
economies, a narrowing of the difference between
income elasticities of U.S. imports and exports,25 and
favourabledemographicdevelopments.Nevertheless,
the extent of the contribution of those factors remains
uncertain. For instance, over the next 20 years or so,
the old age dependency ratio is expected to rise more
rapidly in Japan and Europe than in the United States,
such that savings could fall somewhat more in Japan
and Europe as larger shares of their populations reach
retirement age. However, aging is also expected to
reduce investment spending because of the associated
lower growth of the labour force. As a result, the net
expected effect of aging on external imbalances is
ambiguous. Similarly, a relatively large improvement
25.  The IMF (2001b) has suggested that the estimated income elasticities of
U.S. exports and imports converged somewhat in the 1990s, and that this con-
vergence could continue into the future.20 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • WINTER 2003–2004
in the productivity performance of U.S. trading part-
ners would be required to reduce the U.S. current
account deﬁcit signiﬁcantly.26
Regardless of the role played by
structural factors, there is a broad
consensus that part of the adjustment
of global external imbalances will
come through changes in real
exchange rates.
Yet, regardless of the role played by structural factors,
there is a broad consensus that part of the adjustment
of global external imbalances will come through
changes in real exchange rates.27 In this regard, some
of the major international organizations and economic
commentators believe that a further signiﬁcant real
effective depreciation of the U.S. dollar is required to
help achieve a sustainable U.S. external position
(Table 5).28 It should be noted, however, that the U.S.
dollar does not have to depreciate by the same
amount against all currencies. The more it depreciates
against one currency, the less it needs to depreciate
against others. Indeed, in order to provide sustainable
external positions in all countries, it cannot be true
26. IMF simulation results (2002a) suggest that if annual productivity growth
in the rest of the industrialized countries were to increase relative to that of
the United States by 0.5 percentage points, the U.S. current account deﬁcit
could be reduced by almost $100 billion after ﬁve years. An extrapolation of
this rule of thumb suggests that the elimination of the U.S. current account
deﬁcit over that period, based solely on relative growth performance, would
require a very large sustained improvement—about 2.5 percentage points per
year—in the rate of productivity of U.S. industrialized trading partners.
27.  Several empirical studies (such as Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2000, 2002;
Gagnon 1996; Faruqee 1995) have provided estimates of a positive long-run
relation between net international investment positions and the real exchange
rate, whereby debtor countries tend to have more depreciated real exchange
ratesthatenablethem to run trade surpluses to service their external liabilities
(creditor countries, which can sustain a deﬁcit in their balance of trade equal
to their foreign investment income, tend to have more appreciated real
exchange rates).
28.  As discussed in footnote 23, a depreciation of the U.S. dollar would not
only contribute to a stabilization of the U.S. net external liability position
through a more favourable current account dynamic, but also directly
through valuation changes to U.S. foreign assets. By themselves, valuation
adjustments related to the U.S.-dollar depreciation during 2002 (by about
7 per cent on the basis of the IMF nominal effective exchange rate index) have
reduced the U.S. net external liability position (as a per cent of GDP) by about
2 percentage points. A much larger exchange rate valuation adjustment
would be expected for 2003, given the more pronounced U.S.-dollar deprecia-
tion during that year.
that the U.S. dollar would depreciate by the same
amount against all countries’ currencies.29
Conclusion
The development of current account imbalances in the
major economies can mainly be explained by a combi-
nation of structural and cyclical factors. In particular,
growing imbalances have reﬂected in large part the
relatively favourable U.S. productivity performance
as well as the relatively easier U.S. ﬁscal stance.
As argued by commentators such as the IMF and the
OECD, sound macroeconomic and structural policies
would facilitate the required long-term adjustments to
achieve sustainable external balances and to help
maintain ﬁnancial stability. Such policies should
include further structural reforms that would raise
potential growth and make regions outside the United
States more attractive locations for investment. Strong
domestic demand outside the United States would
boost demand for U.S. goods and services, thereby
helping to reduce external imbalances. As well, ﬁscal
consolidation in the United States would be helpful.
However, most commentators agree that further sig-
niﬁcant adjustments to the real exchange rate will be
necessary over the medium term to achieve sustaina-
ble external positions (i.e., a stabilization of net inter-
national investment positions in relation to GDP).
While part of this adjustment will be against the Japa-
nese yen and the euro, the currencies of other major
U.S. trading partners may be affected as well. As long
as this is accomplished in an orderly fashion, there is
no reason to believe that global ﬁnancial stability
would be compromised.
29.  Real exchange rate movements can take place not only through changes
in nominal exchange rates, but also through differential inﬂation rates.
IMF 20 18
OECD up to 30 up to 13
Mann 25 18
Obstfeld and Rogoff 12 to 45 6 to 39
Table 5
Effective Depreciation in the U.S. Dollar “Required”
to Achieve a Sustainable External Position
Per centa
Original Adjusted for more
estimates recent exchange rate
developmentsb
a. Deﬁned in real terms for the IMF (2003) and Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) and in nominal
terms for the OECD (2001) and Mann (1999)
b. Adjustments attempt to capture the changes in the value of the U.S.-dollar exchange
rate that have taken place since these studies were completed (based on data for the
month of November 2003).21 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • WINTER 2003–2004
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